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Abstract: This paper analyzes how the attempt by feminist epistemologies to overcome 
the impasse between objectivity and relativism has led to various formulations of the 
concept of ‘location’ and to the standpoint theory. As a result, the political project of a 
transnational community of interpreters fostered by transnational feminism can be seen 
as deriving from such enduring process. 
Keywords: feminist epistemology, politics of location, traveling theory, communities of 
affiliation, transnational feminism. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION WITHIN FEMINISM 
The epistemological question has spanned the entire history of feminist thought, 
weaving together a variety of disciplines and depending on other debates within 
feminist theory, including the crucial one about the meaning of sexual difference in the 
development of subjectivity. 
Like a red thread through feminist history, the epistemological question, which had 
been kept carefully hidden in the pants hem of Liberal Feminism, was later used by 
Second Wave Feminists to make flamboyant skirts. More recently, Gender Theorists 
have considered it as what bastes the very folds of the body, as if it were possible to 
make it and unmake it in countless other styles. 
Leaving metaphors aside, while Liberal Feminism claimed the participation of 
women in the public sphere and in the production of knowledge but didn’t dare to 
directly discuss the order and the assumptions of these latter, Second Wave Feminists 
overtly rejected both the social order and the inherited categories of knowledge. 
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Facing an equality that was exclusively political but by no means philosophical 
(Lonzi, 1974), Second Wave Feminists developed a strongly critical attitude towards 
Western philosophical and epistemological traditions and, in order to give an account of 
reality from the perspective of women’s everyday-life experience, they drew on the 
notion of ‘difference’ as the starting point for reviewing the traditional categories of 
thought. 
Influenced by poststructuralism, Black Feminism and Postcolonial Feminism, the 
knowledge production of Gender Theorists has been critical of the polarity between 
equality and difference and has identified the body as a place and a tool for the 
production of a transformative knowledge. 
Whereas the feminist critique of Western epistemology has unmasked the gender 
of the subject of universal knowledge, Black and Postcolonial Feminists have also 
pointed out ‘his’ whiteness. Women and/or postcolonial subjects have thus determined 
a substantial redefinition of epistemology, both with respect to its assumptions as well 
as to its disciplinary boundaries: traditionally regarded as apart from scientific 
knowledge production, ethics and politics have become part of the feminist 
epistemological discourse. 
 
FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AS A ‘SUCCESSOR SCIENCE PROJECT’ 
Feminist epistemology enquires into how gender takes part in knowledge production. 
According to Sandra Harding (1986), attempts to develop a separate feminist theory of 
knowledge dates back to the 70s and were mainly due to the sense of frustration of 
women scientists and biologists, who had tried to ‘add’ women and gender to their 
disciplinary fields without any success. This marked the beginning of a proliferation of 
theoretical writings that challenged the classical conception of epistemology, 
questioning the neutrality of knowledge and its supposed universal validity.  
Although criticisms on the foundations of Western philosophical discourse and 
scientific knowledge were already present in the early writings of both Second Wave 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental Feminists, the elaboration of a feminist theory of 
knowledge has to be considered as a later event. In this sense, the end of the 70s 
marked a turning point within feminism towards a broader theoretical and philosophical 
production: theory was seen not only as the most exclusive tool of patriarchal 
supremacy, but also as a contested place where power was generated and 
regenerated (Cavarero and Restaino, 2009). In particular, Western epistemology was 
considered as a construction that produces answers to a kind of questions an 
androcentric society has about nature and social life (Harding, 1991): a construction 
based on hierarchical disciplinary boundaries as ‘enclosures’ corresponding to the 
The Feminist ‘Successor Science Project’ as a Transnational Epistemological Community  
12 
patriarchal order. This awareness has paved the way for a radical epistemology, whose 
main method consists in crossing disciplinary borders with explicitly ‘archaeological’ 
and ‘genealogical’ purposes (Braidotti, 1991).   
Describing the science project envisioned by feminists, Haraway writes: 
 
Feminists have stakes in a successor science project that offers a more 
adequate, richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, 
reflective relation to our own as well as others’ practices of domination and the 
unequal parts of privilege and oppression that make up all positions. In traditional 
philosophical categories, the issue is ethics and politics perhaps more than 
epistemology. (1991: 187) 
 
Far from seeking the goal of value-neutrality, the “successor science project” 
described by Haraway aims at including areas traditionally separate from classical 
epistemology, such as those of ethics and politics. Moreover it explicitly addresses 
issues of power relationships among subjects, while also aiming at producing a 
knowledge able to account for such inequalities. But where does such a different 
formulation of epistemology stem from? And how can a science project also entail 
questions of politics and ethics? 
It is possible to argue that feminist theory undertakes an investigation not only on 
the object but also on the subject of traditional knowledge, recognizing both as 
implicitly gendered. Such recognition is fraught with consequences, since it marks the 
crisis of self-legitimation of the universal Cartesian subject which has to be considered 
as the hallmark of postmodern societies (Lyotard, 1979). In other words, the 
development of a feminist theory of knowledge coincides with and contributes to the 
so-called 'crisis' of modern thought, in relation to which the ‘woman question’ appears 
since its beginning as a symptom of anxiety. Rosi Braidotti argues that starting from 
Nietzsche and passing by all the major European philosophers, this question has 
accompanied the decline and the crisis of the classical conception of human 
subjectivity. In line with this, postmodernity is marked by “the return of the ‘Others’ of 
modernity: woman, the sexual Other of man, the ethnic or native, the Other of the 
Eurocentric subject and the natural or the earth, the Other of the techno culture” 
(Braidotti, 2002: 117). 
Having grasped at the historical opportunity to radically question Western scientific 
thought, however, feminists have a different aim from thinkers who merely state the 
crisis of the modern subject. They are not simply interested in deconstructing the 
traditional subject of knowledge: their aim is promoting a positive process of 
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subjectification of woman. Thus, feminist epistemology turns out to be a political project 
aimed at redefining women as subjects of an alternative form of knowledge. Whereas 
some feminists envisage this historic moment as an opportunity to move to a phase of 
authoritative statement, abandoning all forms of nostalgia (Braidotti, 2002), others 
speak in a less triumphant tone and rather highlight the difficulties that the same 
feminist epistemological project faces: 
 
I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims 
of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity, and so 
contestability, of every layer of the onion of scientific and technological 
constructions, and we end up with a kind of epistemological electro-shock 
therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables of the game of 
contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple 
personality disorder. (Haraway, 1991: 186) 
 
SUBJECT, OBJECT AND KNOWLEDGE OUTSIDE BINARY THINKING 
Generally, it is possible to define epistemology as an account on the subject of 
knowledge, the object of study and the relationship that develops between them.  As 
regards feminist epistemology, it is necessary to clarify how the debate around this 
triad has constantly fluctuated between the denial of an all-encompassing realism and 
the risk of a paralyzing postmodern relativism. 
In this paragraph, I focus on the instability behind the same terms ‘subject’, ‘object’ 
and ‘knowledge’ within the feminist debate on epistemology, as well as on the issues at 
stake behind the same definition of ‘gender’ in relation to ‘sex’.  
Subsequent to the feminist critique of the homosocial construction of science 
(Irigaray, 1989; Donini, 2000; Cavarero and Restaino, 2009), feminists are left with the 
following questions:  
1) Who can be subject of knowledge? Or, better, what does legitimate certain subjects 
of knowledge over others? 
2) What can be known? What does legitimize knowledge production? What defines 
objectivity?  
3) “Can there be a disinterested knowledge in a society that is deeply stratified by 
gender, class, race?” (Harding, 1991: 110). 
These deeply intertwined questions will lead to a profound redefinition of the terms 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ and knowledge. In an article published in 1989 – titled The 
Gender/Science System: Or, Is Sex to Gender as Nature Is to Science? – Evelyn Fox 
Keller explores the problematic relation between sex and gender in parallel with the 
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equally problematic relation between nature and science. The article touches upon 
issues such as the social construction of woman as the ‘other’ of the subject of 
knowledge, the instability behind the categories of gender and science, the question of 
the primacy of gender as heuristic tool over others. According to Keller (1989), the 
scientific discourse has included women in its sight as object of investigation, but has 
excluded them from its practice. In the last century, the main strategy used by women 
seeking entrance to the homosocial world of science “has been premised on the 
repudiation of gender as a significant variable for scientific productivity” (Keller, 1989: 
39): equality was therefore possible as long as any difference was silenced. 
Keller focuses on this paradox, drawing a parallel between feminist studies and 
science studies. As feminist studies emerge with the distinction between sex and 
gender, contemporary science studies emerge with the “realization that science can 
never be a ‘mirror of nature’” (Keller, 1989: 37). In other words, both feminist studies 
and science studies emerge respectively on the assumption that “gender is not to be 
defined by sex nor science by nature” (ibidem: 38). The ensuing question is: how are 
they respectively to be defined then?   
The answers to this question have an immediate consequence to the same 
definitions of both subject and object of knowledge within feminist epistemology. In fact, 
how can we have a theory of subjectivity and, thus, an accountable subject of 
knowledge if we are not able to clearly define the relationship between sex and 
gender?  
It is worth noticing that the attempt to redefine the relationship between gender and 
sex is immediately linked to the production of a ‘successor science’ (Harding, 1986; 
Haraway, 1991). In fact, once rejected the neutrality of the classical subject of 
knowledge, the possibility of a ‘successor science’ necessarily presupposes a new 
theory of subjectivity. The feminist epistemological debate is thus intertwined with the 
feminist polyphonic debate on woman subjectivity, which, as Keller (1989 38) 
denounces, seems to have been leaning “toward biological determinism or toward 
infinite plasticity”. On the other side, if science is not a mirror of nature, how can we 
define knowledge if it doesn’t immediately conflate with its object (i.e. nature)? In other 
words, what is knowledge and what can be known? 
Keller (1989) emphasizes that the categories of ‘gender’ and ‘science’ have come 
into being taking distance and differentiating themselves from their respectively 
complementary categories of ‘sex’ and ‘nature’. It is possible to argue that the 
construction of both ‘gender and ‘science’ has followed a ‘binary scheme’, whereas sex 
is equated to nature and gender to science. According to the feminist critic of science, 
the same relationship between subject and object of knowledge has traditionally 
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followed a “binary logic” (Irigaray, 1989). To this regard, it is worth noticing that one of 
the feminist aims has been to change the negative and oppressive meaning around the 
notion of ‘difference’ within the dialectic Self/Other. In a way, dealing with the European 
theoretical tradition from a feminist perspective cannot but imply dealing with the 
dialectic between sameness and difference within European history (Braidotti, 2002), 
where to be different has meant to be worthless and has justified relations of 
domination and exclusion outside and inside the continent. In fact, rather than being 
understood in relational terms, difference has been ‘essentialized’. With regard to 
feminist epistemology, such awareness has various implications. It warns on the need 
to change the oppressive relationship between subject and object of knowledge as 
constructed by the gendered binary system underpinning Western scientific discourse. 
Moreover, it calls for a definition of the same relationship between gender and sex 
outside of a binary mode.  
Claire Colebrook (2004) traces the binary distinction between sex and gender back 
to the anti-metaphysical tendency of modern thought, which, refusing what cannot be 
known and verified, has shifted the focus on evidence and materiality. Consequently, 
the emphasis on science and observation has led to a growing awareness of the 
subject as observer and knower. According to Colebrook, such a shift from a world of 
forms, in which man was placed, to a realm of observable and quantifiable matter has 
had two main consequences. In the first place, if matter is the basis of reality, with 
forms as effect of observation, it is then possible to think of sex as the matter of each 
individual, which might, or not, be determined by gender. Secondly, once matter is 
conceived as pre-linguistic and ‘without meaning’, it is then possible to think of subject 
as the starting point from which matter is known and ordered:  from ‘man’ as an animal 
among others within a hierarchy of forms, we move to the ‘Subject’ who is able to 
represent and quantify matter. The theory of the subject differs from previous theories 
about man as an animal in the cosmos with his own nature: now ‘He’ is nothing more 
than his ability to perceive and represent the world (the Cartesian cogito ergo sum).  
This has major political consequences, since it implies that in the name of the 
individual’s ability to reason all subjects should relate to each other equally. The old 
political order based on differences among men by God's will is now replaced by a new 
political order based on equality among individuals in front of nature. However, since 
the binary opposition between nature and culture is one of the ways hierarchies 
between men and women have been mostly expressed (Donini, 2000), the modern 
principle of equality, although being extremely revolutionary for men, turns out to be 
radically conservative for women. Such a paradox is inscribed in the same historical 
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origin of the egalitarian model which denies differences between men, but leaves aside 
sexual difference (Cavarero and Restaino, 2009). 
If ‘woman’ has been constructed as the ‘Other’ of the scientific discourse, not only 
as different, but also as binarily opposed to the legitimate subject of knowledge, it 
means that no knowledge has ever been formulated from the perspective of woman’s 
life and experience. Furthermore, the same apparently transparent category of ‘woman’ 
has to be considered as unreliable, since resulting from a long standing patriarchal 
tradition which has silenced women as subjects of knowledge. As Harding (1991: 69) 
states: “the subject of knowledge – the individual and the historically located social 
community whose unexamined beliefs its members are likely to hold ‘unknowingly’ 
[become] part of the object of Knowledge”.  
Deprived of the very category of ‘woman’ itself, feminists linger on categories such 
as those of body, experience, location and power relations. The development of a 
theory of knowledge based on experience will open the way to a profound rethinking of 
the same concept of ‘objectivity’ which, as Donini (2000) stresses, is so central and yet 
so little discussed in science. Because of their experience, Black Feminists in the U.S. 
warn about the risk of giving priority to the category of gender over other axes of 
subjectification, such as those of race or class among others. In other words, they 
focus on the ‘politics of knowledge’ inquiring the status among disciplines and 
categories: why should gender as analytical category be considered different from, 
perhaps even prior to, categories of race, class, etc.? And in turn, “is science 
substantively different from other social structures or interest group?” (Keller,1989: 38).   
 
AGAINST “THE DEADLY SAMENESS OF ABSTRACTION”:1 THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 
In Whose knowledge? Whose Science?, Harding (1991) explains how most scientists 
have regarded the feminist perspective as political and in this sense against scientific 
reason and observation. In fact, while Western science believes in the existence of a 
trans-historical universal truth, knowable by applying scientific methods of objectivity 
and rationality, feminists insist on the partial nature of objectivity reclaiming the role of 
the body as a site of knowledge. Although not denying science in itself, they reject a 
knowledge based on the belief of a division between nature and culture, on the 
supposed existence of a sort of ‘external truth’, on “the separation of information from 
meaning” which results from moving objects of study from their contexts (Hill Collins, 
1991: 205). In order to challenge the apparently “impersonal, objective, value-free 
facts” (Harding, 1991: 105) that natural social science pretends to produce, feminists 
                                               
1
 I owe this expression to Adrienne Rich (1987: 221). 
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reclaim an epistemology that takes into account the concept of ‘location’ as the starting 
point for the development of a critical thinking. The feminist epistemic practice of 
addressing the ‘politics of location’ can be considered in fact as one of the 
epistemological foundations of feminist theory and particularly of feminist epistemology. 
Since its beginning, reflections on the concept of ‘location’ have aimed at fostering 
accountability for how feminists know and act within the place they inhabit, reproduce 
and transform. 
I argue that such a practice has strong resonances with the practice of self-
narration which was so central in the early years of Second Wave Feminism. As the 
politics of location originates from the necessity to develop an accountable and 
transformative knowledge consistent with life, in a similar way, the early Second Wave 
Feminists’ focus on self-narration has to be seen as a central political practice aiming 
at redefining woman subjectivity outside of a patriarchal culture. Far more than being a 
narcissistic attitude then, such a technique was adopted by women who were trying to 
deconstruct and re-signify sexual difference both individually as well as collectively. 
Telling their own lives, women were also reclaiming words that up to then had been 
meant to silence them. In this sense, it is possible to argue that, by lingering on the gap 
between their experience and the lack of words to name it, feminists have soon 
recognized  language as a ‘site of power’, thus anticipating the future that  such a 
concept would have had in the academy.  
Aiming at being illustrative rather than exhaustive, I will now present some of the 
reformulations that the concept of ‘politics of location’ has undergone over the last thirty 
years, starting from the one by the North American poet, writer and feminist activist 
Adrienne Rich, who first coined the concept in the mid-80s. At the age of fifty, reflecting 
on her life as a feminist intellectual and activist and interrogating her personal and 
socio-structural location, Rich reconsiders the statement made by Virginia Woolf in 
Three Guineas (apud Rich, 1987: 211): “As a woman I have no country. As a woman I 
want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world.” She realizes that such a 
statement does not allow her to be accountable in particular as regards her whiteness 
in the context of a larger feminist politics and international power relations. Back from 
her travel to Nicaragua and reflecting on her North American location, Rich realizes 
that “a place on the map is also a place in history within which as a woman, a Jew, a 
lesbian, a feminist [she is] created and trying to create” (ibidem: 212). Positioning 
herself in time and space, Rich recognizes the privilege as well as the partiality of her 
location. This warns her to reduce the temptation of “grandiose assertions” and to 
abandon the illusion of “knowing” for all women around the globe. The practice of 
addressing the politics of location is thus based on the recognition that by speaking 
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from a position of recognized specificity, feminists are less likely to generalize and 
speak about all women. Focusing on a politics of location is thus a way to “interrupt the 
reproduction of values and behaviors that get repeated generation after generation” 
(ibidem: 225). Being a way to take critical distance from the subject position that we are 
historically expected to inhabit, Rich regarded such a practice as a tool for creating a 
feminist movement that ‘de-westernizes’ itself and that doesn’t homogenize itself 
through the expression of a single voice.  
Following these considerations, Caren Kaplan (1994) argues that the politics of 
location has expanded the ground of what counts as theory and who can be 
considered as theorist by deconstructing the hegemonic use of the world ‘woman’ 
within Western feminism and its privileged position of whiteness. According to South 
Asian born postcolonial theorist Chandra Mohanty (1995: 75), “the universality of 
gender oppression is problematic, based as it is on the assumption that the category of 
race and class have to be invisible for gender to be visible”. Thus, in order to address 
the multiplicity and dynamism of locations that a postcolonial feminist inhabits at any 
given moment, and the self-definitions and modes of knowledge that arise from them, 
Mohanty proposes a modified practice of the politics of location that takes into 
consideration “the historical, geographical, cultural, psychic and imaginative boundaries 
which provides the ground for political definition and self-definition” (apud Kaplan, 
1994: 137).  
African-American feminist writer bell hooks imagines the politics of location as a 
dialectic space between oppression and resistance, as a space “where we begin the 
process of revision”, not a static home or a center, but a process of moving “beyond 
boundaries” (bell hooks, 1990: 151). For bell hooks, a location is a theoretical space 
and a space of oppositional agency that she calls the ‘margin’. The margin is both a 
site of oppression and a site of radical possibility, a space of resistance.  Speaking of 
the pain of having been made ‘Other’ and confronting silences and inarticulateness 
within herself, hooks’ personal struggle concerns naming “that location from which [she 
has] come to voice that space of [her] theorising” (apud Kaplan, 1994: 143). 
African American theorist Patricia Hill Collins (1991) distinguishes between two 
modes of knowing: one located in the body and the space it occupies, the other 
passing beyond it. Here Hill Collins refers to the privileged position of the Afro-
American woman as “outsider within”. Being at the same time outside and inside a 
culture is what allowed African-Americans to resist repression and develop their 
knowledge. In particular, Hill Collins (1991: 208), referring to “a core African value 
system” as a characterizing element of black experience, draws a distinction between 
knowledge and wisdom. According to Hill Collins (ibidem), “knowledge without wisdom 
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is adequate for the powerful but wisdom is essential to the survival of the subordinate”. 
Moreover, for black women “new knowledge claims are rarely worked out in isolation 
from other individuals” (Hill Collins, 1991: 212). As a result, connectedness rather than 
isolation creates knowledge and allows developing an ethic of personal accountability 
that is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. 
At the core of these different interpretations of the concept of location, there is a 
different way of interpreting experience itself. It seems that, through the practice of 
telling their own lives as well as naming their own location, these theorists have 
regarded ‘experience’ neither as a plain category nor as “the bedrock of evidence on 
which explanation is built” (Scott, 1991: 777). Rather, experience itself has to be 
considered as socially constructed and entailing issues of ‘vision’, language, 
subjectivity, history and social relations. In fact, as Joan Scott argues (ibidem: 778), 
“the evidence of experience reproduces rather than contests given ideological 
systems”. For this reason, taking experience as a site of knowledge presupposes a 
critical analyses “of the ideological system itself, its categories of representation […], its 
premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, […] its notions of 
subjects, origin, and cause” (ibidem). Scott’s invitation to historicize experience as well 
as the identities that produces draws further attention on the subject of knowledge, 
which has to be conceived as historically constructed: 
 
we need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position 
subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have 
experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. (Scott, 1991: 
779) 
 
In this perspective, women’s experience doesn’t have to be considered as the 
origin of feminist knowledge, but rather that which women seek to explain, that about 
which knowledge is produced.  
 
FROM THE POLITICS OF LOCATION TO THE POLITICS OF ENGAGEMENT: THE STANDPOINT 
THEORY 
The feminist ‘standpoint theory’ argues that knowledge is socially situated and claims 
that research directed by social values and political agenda produces preferable 
empirical and theoretical results. The approach of the standpoint theory originates in 
the belief that “human activity, or ‘material life’, not only structures but sets limits on 
human understanding” (Harding, 1991: 120) and is based on the assumption that social 
locations systematically shape and limit what we know. There are clearly points of 
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connection between the politics of location and the feminist standpoint theory. In fact, 
the epistemic practice of addressing the social locations with respect to ensuing 
knowledge claims, which is at the core of the politics of location, is also crucial for 
standpoint theorists. However, according to the standpoint theory, addressing one’s 
social location is not enough to reach a standpoint, since a standpoint is achieved 
through a collective awareness of the workings of the ideological system and the 
resulting development of an oppositional knowledge.  As Wylie states: 
 
standpoint theory is concerned not just with the epistemic effects of social 
locations but both with the effects and the emancipatory potential of standpoints 
that are struggled for, achieved, by epistemic agents who are critically aware of 
the conditions under which knowledge is produced and authorized. (2003: 31) 
 
In this sense, as Sandra Harding argues (1991: 127), “a standpoint it is not 
something that anyone can have simply by claiming it. It is an achievement”. Harding 
also reminds us (1993: 53) that standpoint theory originates from “Hegel’s reflections 
on what can be known about the master/slave relationship from the standpoint of the 
slave’s life”. In a gender perspective, this means that men’s ruling position in society 
results in “partial and perverse understanding”, “whereas women’s subjugated position 
provides the possibility of a more complete and less perverse understandings” 
(Harding, 1986: 26). Thus, according to standpoint theory, marginalized positions have 
an ‘epistemic privilege’ in analyzing the dominant power structure: by collectively 
achieving an oppositional standpoint through political self-consciousness, they can 
generate more objective or less false and distorted accounts of the social world (Hill 
Collins, 1991). 
It is worth noticing that many standpoint theorists have warned of the danger of 
sustaining tout court that the position of subjugation is a privileged position to access 
‘truth’. In fact, such a simplified perspective can lead to an essentialist belief in the 
validity of minority positions simply because they are minority, as if the production of 
knowledge is simply a one-to-one relationship between the subject and its social 
location. The idea of a standpoint as a simple reflection of social location not only 
denies the relational nature of knowledge, but it also doesn’t explain why the 
interpretation of a subjugated subject can represent a threat to the dominant reading of 
reality.  
Concerning this, I argue that, in the passage from experience to knowledge, the 
role of “situated imagination” (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002) should be 
acknowledged. 
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As Donna Haraway puts it: 
 
Subjugation is not grounds for an ontology; it might be a visual clue. Vision 
requires instrument of vision; an optic is a politics of positioning. Instruments of 
vision mediate standpoints; there is no immediate vision from the standpoints of 
the subjugated […] Positioning is therefore, the key practice grounding 
Knowledge organized around the imaginary vision as so much Western scientific 
and philosophic discourse is organized. (1991: 195) 
 
The interpretation of the experience lived by a subject can thus be considered as 
an ‘imaginative location’ from which the subject grounds her/his knowledge. Far from 
being misunderstood as ‘pure fantasy’, situated imagination has to be recognized as a 
re-appropriation on behalf of a subject of specific discursive formations, in the attempt 
to re-negotiate her/his position through a modification of their meaning. Therefore 
imagining can create the premises for something desirable to happen, directing 
changes while also contributing to a renewal of the collective imaginary because of the 
relational nature of knowledge. As Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis (2002: 324) state, 
“situated imagination should neither be rejected nor celebrated”, rather its crucial role in 
the knowledge process should be acknowledged, because of its double bond to both 
the corporeal and the social dimension, which allows to incorporate emotions in the 
intellectual process. On a political level, asserting knowledge as a situated imaginative 
interpretation of reality allows to expand the ground of what counts as theory and who 
can be considered a theorist, while also opening the way to the possibility of imagining 
new individual as well as collective identities out of the experiences and relative 
knowledge which characterizes one’s subject position. 
 
TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECT 
The need to take into account power relations among knowledge, disciplines and 
analytical categories is at the core of the debate on ‘transnational feminism’. In this 
paragraph, I argue that feminist transnationalism can be primarily defined as a political 
project of epistemological renewal which has taken off from the acknowledgment of the 
unreliability of the same category ‘woman’. 
In the last three decades and a half, feminists have been toying with the idea of a 
worldwide alliance among women. The 70s idea of an international sisterhood gave 
rise, particularly since the publication of Robin Morgan’s Sisterhood is Global in 1984, 
to a debate that has involved numerous feminists. Following the genealogy of this 
debate it is possible to recognize the almost paradigmatic shift that occurred in feminist 
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theory between the 70s and 90s: most feminist critique took distance from a modernist 
theoretical framework in favor of a constructivist perspective and a theorization of the 
concept of difference(s) as a critical category. As Michele Barrett and Anne Phillips 
(1992) explain more fully, this shift was essential due to three major factors: 
1) black women’s critique of the racist and ethnocentric assumptions of white feminism; 
2) the revaluation of the concept of difference, above all sexual difference;  
3) the appropriation and development of poststructuralist and postmodernist ideas by 
feminists. 
In light of all these considerations, it became evident that the idea(l) of a worldwide 
alliance among women was a complex challenge. In particular, being mainly an 
imaginary product of Western feminists – either academicians or activists – the project 
of a global alliance could not avoid addressing the risks of:  
1) promoting an alliance among women on the basis of the essentialist belief that 
women all over the world share the same experience because of being women; 
2) spreading Western feminism by Western middle-class women as a new form of 
cultural colonialism; 
3) supporting a homogenizing universalism in the attempt to create common policies. 
In the attempt to avoid these risks, antiracist and postcolonial feminist scholars 
(Enloe, 1989; Mohanty, 1988 and 2002; Alexander, 2005; Grewal and Kaplan, 1994; 
Wekker, 1995) have criticized the notion of ‘global feminism’ as a category unable to 
address the existing unequal global relations which shape women’s lives in different 
settings. In its place they have proposed to elaborate on the notion of ‘transnational 
feminism’. While recognizing power relationships and differences among women, 
transnational feminism doesn’t give up the idea of forging alliance among women 
located differently. Thus the questions that keep transnational feminism busy are: how 
is it possible to create an alliance among women located differently? What kind of 
alliance would that be? In other words, “how can we build collectivity in difference?” 
(Braidotti, 1994: 99). 
 
LOCATING TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM  
As Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1994) explain clearly in their introduction to 
Scattered Hegemonies, the question of transnational feminism is inscribed in 
discourses of modernism and postmodernism and particularly in the acknowledgment 
of the continuity as well as discontinuity between these two. In fact, although 
transnational feminism originates from a critique of the universalistic assumptions 
behind the modernist idea of global sisterhood, it questions neither the necessity nor 
the possibility of global alliances between women. What transnational feminism 
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questions – of the modernist idea of global sisterhood – is the fact that such an alliance 
could be ‘naturally’ and immediately found among women of different locations on the 
basis of their supposed common experience as women. In line with a postmodern 
perspective, although rejecting its potentially relativistic drifts, transnational feminism 
recognizes that acknowledging and valorizing differences among women’s experiences 
is the only possible starting point to avoid the replication of a Eurocentric politics. In 
order to avoid another colonial enterprise in the name of Feminism, a transnational 
feminist politics needs to take distance from a modernist framework and its legacy in 
“colonial discourses and hegemonic First World formation that wittingly or unwittingly 
lead to the oppression and exploitation of many women” (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994: 2). 
In this sense, it seems clear that the difficulty of transnational feminism, but also its 
challenge, is how to promote a worldwide alliance among women not haunted by the 
specter of Western imperialism. To this purpose any possible discursive continuity 
between the political project underpinning transnational feminism and modernity needs 
to be recognized and examined and critical category of thought need to be unchained 
from old paradigms. As Kaplan (1994: 134) states: 
 
The claiming of a world space for women raises temporal questions as well as 
spatial consideration, question of history as well as place. Can such claims be 
imagined outside the conceptual parameters of modernity? 
 
The accomplishment of such a project seems to depend mostly on the ability to 
analyze and take distance from inherited categories of thought generated by 
modernity’s historical and spatial contingencies which are possibly expressive of 
Eurocentric standpoints. In this perspective, I argue that the discursive as well as 
‘meta-discursive’ nature of transnational feminism is unequivocally manifest: 
transnational feminism needs to rethink politics in post-modern time through an 
analysis of inherited categories of thought and through the production of new concepts 
or a new discourse able to account for multiple conditions and claims. 
Looking at transnational feminism as a discursive formation willing to expand 
allows us to understand more easily which are the issues at stake in it and where its 
potentialities and its risks lay. Moreover it facilitates the task to address more clearly 
questions about who is speaking, when, from which location, and to trace back what is 
the origin of discourses within transnational feminism and whose standpoints they 
represent. 
Transnational feminism, both as a political project and theoretical approach, 
originates from a strong critique of modernity and its ‘monological’ imaginary, which 
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from Enlightenment onwards has supported, through the institutionalization of cultural 
and political formations, the propagation of ‘supposedly universally valid’ categories of 
thought; the latter proving just functional to authorize Eurocentric-hierarchically-
gendered-and-racialized systems.  
With the intention of discarding this Western line of thought, imposed outside 
Europe in the past through colonization and today overly reproduced through the 
propagation of global neo-imperialist liberal projects, transnational feminism has 
benefited from the reflections of various black and postcolonial feminists, particularly on 
issues of difference among women and feminist epistemologies. Indeed, since the first 
aim of transnational feminism is forging alliances among subjects differently located 
through the development of a new discourse able to account for multiple conditions and 
claims, transnational feminism cannot set aside a critique of Western epistemology as 
a necessary premise. In this sense, Kaplan’s invitation to raise “temporal questions as 
well as spatial consideration outside the conceptual parameters of modernity” means 
firstly “decentering the center” (Harding and Narayan, 2000), realizing the partiality of 
one’s own location and admitting the existence of thousands of centers of episteme.  
As one among other centers of knowledge production, transnational feminism 
cannot avoid undergoing the feminist epistemological scrutiny that reveals its being 
mainly an academic discourse. In other words, transnational feminism needs to 
acknowledge that the theoretical framework on which it relates, originates mainly from 
Western academia, an institution that has proven very often incapable of accounting for 
the continuous changes in the life’s conditions of people outside academia, and that is 
definitely connoted in terms of race, class and gender. As a further evidence of this I 
would remark that Grewal and Kaplan (1994: 3) notice, for example, that the discourse 
of postmodernism as one of the main theoretical branches of transnational feminism 
has been expressed in the West primarily as an aesthetic or cultural debate rather than 
a political one: “such debates ignore the radical changes in global economical structure 
that have occurred since the middle of this century.” As bell hooks  comments referring 
to postmodernism: 
  
It is sadly ironic that the contemporary discourse that talks the most about 
heterogeneity […] still directs its critical voice primarily to a specialized audience 
that shares a common language rooted in the very master narratives it claims to 
challenge. (1990: 25) 
 
In its desire to promote an alliance among women around the globe, transnational 
feminism has to acknowledge both its power and its limits derived from being mainly a 
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Western academic discourse. This implies that transnational feminism has to verify the 
accessibility of its project for other women around the globe but also that it has to 
acknowledge the necessity to adopt a language that doesn’t leave out women with 
different experiences. In order to do that, the academic discourse of transnational 
feminism has to pay attention to, and enter in contact with, different languages and 
social realities. In other words, transnational feminism has to take into consideration 
the knowledge productions of those women who have more often been objects of study 
of Western feminists (Mohanty, 1988 and 2002). 
Kaplan (1994) invites Western feminists to investigate the reason and the need of 
their desire of forging alliances with women across national borders rather than first 
engaging with other women at home. In fact, confronting different standpoints within 
the same social context could be a useful exercise to truly start addressing the issue of 
differences among women on axes of differentiations less evident than the one of 
national belonging. In light of these considerations it becomes clear that the first step to 
forge alliances across national borders passes through a multiplication of questions 
related to how to forge alliances across racial, ethnical, cultural, sexual, economical, 
religious borders as well as across different citizenship status and working conditions. 
To this purpose, the aim and modality of transnational feminism should be directed to 
forge alliances across the historical intersections between different forms of women’s 
movements, and thus to learn about the ways in which social, economic, and political 
structures of race, sexuality, gender and class, shape and inform feminist practices 
with the intent to develop consistent feminist transnational standpoints.  
In turn, on an academic level, transnational feminism should opt for a methodology, 
that, as Gloria Wekker (2004: 495), suggests, takes distance from the biases of 
western academic methodology in favor of a “interdisciplinary, intersectional, reflexive 
perspective as well as a relational approach”, that allows to link histories of colonialism 
and postcolonialism, and theories of nationalism and globalization. 
 
COMMUNITIES OF AFFILIATION  
Searching for a proper and valuable model of community for its political project, 
transnational feminism has particularly benefited from the reflections inspired by 
Edward Said’s articles “Traveling Theory” (1983) and “Travelling Theory Revisited” 
(2001a). In these latter, while examining the way in which certain theories have been 
travelling in diverse settings in the course of time and observing their transformations, 
Said draws particular attention to the potentiality of theory to create communities of 
‘affiliation’.  
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In his first article “Traveling Theory”, Said reflects on the consequences of a theory 
that travels: 
  
Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel – from person to 
person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. […] Having said 
that, however, one should go on to specify the kinds of movements that are 
possible […]. Such movements into a new environment are never unimpeded. It 
necessarily involves processes of representation and institutionalization different 
from those at the point of origin. This complicates an account of the 
transplantation, transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas. 
(1983: 226) 
 
According to Said, the changes that theory may come across with, after it has 
traveled, are different. While in his first article “Traveling Theory”, Said (1983: 436) 
sustains that “the force of a theory comes from being directly connected to and 
organically provoked by real historical circumstances” and that “later versions of theory 
cannot replicate its original power”, in “Traveling Theory Revisited” Said (2001a: 436) 
recognizes the possibility of an alternative mode of traveling theory that developed 
away from its original formulation, but instead of becoming domesticated “flames out, 
so to speak, restates and reaffirms its own inherent tension by moving to another site”. 
Said names this type of re-interpreted theory “transgressive theory”. Then he goes on 
providing two examples of transgressive theory. The first is the reinterpretation of 
Lukács’ theory of reification by Adorno in his Philosophie der neuen Musik in 1948. The 
second is the reinterpretation of Lukács’ theory of reification by Fanon in The Wretched 
of the Earth in 1961. What is important to underline here is that, although the 
differences between these two authors and between these two works in terms of time, 
contents and intents are evident, Said considers possible to address both Fanon and 
Adorno as belonging to a same community. He writes: 
 
One would not, could not, want to assimilate Viennese twelve-tone music to the 
Algerian resistance to French colonialism: the disparities are too grotesque even 
to articulate. But in both situations, each so profoundly and concretely felt by 
Adorno and Fanon respectively, is the fascinating Lukácsian figure, present both 
as traveling theory and as intransigent practice. To speak here only of borrowing 
and adaptation is not adequate. There is in particular an intellectual, and perhaps 
moral, community of a remarkable kind, affiliation in the deepest and most 
interesting sense of the word. (Said, 2001a: 436) 
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These two authors and their respective theories are not assimilable to each other: 
they write in two different periods, from two different locations, they are concerned with 
two different disciplines. Nevertheless they are in ‘communication’, although indirectly, 
through the theory of Lukács. What links them is that when facing the same concept, 
they both felt impelled to answer it through their interpretation; they both recognized 
and felt compelled to interpret the same signs which triggered their imagination. Then, 
Adorno and Fanon interpreted them according to their own experience, contextual 
situation and “situated imagination” (Stoezler and Yuval-Davis, 2002). In other words, 
they both interpreted Lukács theory of reification each from their own ‘socio-emotional' 
location. In this sense, the ‘moral community’ envisioned by Said is a ‘community of 
interpreters’, linked per affinity by their critical capacity to change and adapt a theory; to 
engage in an “intransigent practice” of re-interpretation that is almost an act of creation.   
In the light of these considerations, it becomes possible now trying to imagine the 
kind of community theorized by Said and describing the features of a transnational 
community for affiliation. Not based on modernist discursive formations such as those 
of national belonging, identity, class and race, this community-model contemplates the 
idea of difference among its members, but most importantly it contemplates the idea 
that each member would interpret the same theory according to her/his location. Such 
a community is grounded on the epistemological autonomy of each of its members and 
promotes a conversational model of interactions. Moreover such a model is based on 
the awareness of the impossibility of any theory to account for everything in existence. 
Thus theory appears as a tool that needs always to be tested and whose dependence 
on the social context and experience of the subjects needs to be constantly 
acknowledged. 
 
THE POLITICS OF RECEPTION AS A POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
The possibilities that traveling concepts create transnational communities of ‘affiliation’ 
are not at all limited to the circulation of literary or philosophical theories. On the 
contrary, this has become a founding feature of contemporary society as it is easily 
confirmable in the existence of diverse forms of affiliation, such as those evoked by late 
capitalist global marketing or those resulting from the free circulation of ideas through 
the global media networks. The latter, in particular, have radically reconfigured the 
relationships between elite and popular culture and have created the possibility of a 
heavy investment in mass mediated forms of political affiliation (Woodhull, 2003). 
In an article titled “History, Literature, and Geography”, it is the same Said who 
presents the complexity of the contemporary situation. Reflecting on the reconfiguration 
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of the relationships between elite and popular culture and the consequent proliferations 
of different standpoints he writes: 
 
[We face today] a new geographical consciousness of a de-centered or multiply-
centered world, a world no longer sealed within watertight compartments of art of 
culture or history, but mixed, mixed up, varied, complicated by the new difficult 
mobility of migrations, the new independent state […] the concept of literature 
has been expanded beyond texts to the general category of culture to include the 
mass media and journalism, film, video, rock and folk music, each of which 
contains its own completely dissonant history of dissent protest, and resistance, 
such as the history of students movements, or women’s history, or the history of 
subaltern classes and people. (Said, 2001b: 471)   
 
Yet, if from one side it is undeniable that today there is a proliferation of centers of 
knowledge production as well as a proliferation of languages and jargons, on the other 
side this proliferation is not void of power dynamics and does not necessarily 
correspond to an increase in the circulation of different standpoints. As Ernesto Laclau 
argues postmodernity is not a simple rejection of modernity; “rather, it involves a 
different modulation of its themes and categories, a greater proliferation of its language 
games” (apud Kaplan, 1996: 20). In fact, If from one side transnationalization of culture 
brings with it numerous possibilities for forging alliances and forms of resistance, from 
the other side, these same conditions also induce the proliferation of old power 
relationships under the guise of new. This is probably what Grewal and Kaplan (1994) 
mean when they refer to the idea of “scattered hegemonies” in their book on 
transnational feminist politic in postmodern time. Or what Jacqui Alexander refers to, 
when invites the reader to discard the modernist idea of time as linear and progressive, 
and to get acquainted, instead, with the idea of “a scrambled and palimpsestic time […] 
with the premodern, the modern, the postmodern and the paramodern coexisting 
globally” (2005:190). In other words, with an idea of time in which new and old 
discursive formations not only coexist, but also conflate.   
In this complicated scenario, feminists need to develop critical tools to decode old 
discursive formations under the guise of new and to react to the attempt on behalf of 
power formations to appropriate and tame words. As Rosi Braidotti states: 
 
Feminists need to become fluent in a variety of styles and disciplinary angles and 
in many different dialects, jargons, languages, thereby relinquishing the image of 
sisterhood in the sense of a global similarity of all women qua second sex in favor 
Betta Pesole  
29 
of the recognition and complexity of the semiotic and material conditions in which 
women operate. (1994:1) 
 
Thus, the existence of a transnational feminism strictly depends on the feminists’ 
capacity to see the limits of any theory or concept as well as to be receptive to the 
suggestions and influences of theories produced in different settings in the attempt to 
distinguish between commonalities and inconsistencies among women’s needs and 
priorities. In other words, as Caren Kaplan (1994: 139) suggests, transnational 
feminism needs to elaborate on a specific “politics of reception”. 
The practice of a politics of reception is suggested by Kaplan to Western feminists 
with the aim of counteracting the direction of flows of concepts exclusively ‘from the 
West to the rest’ and to facilitate circulations of concepts according to patterns 
unpredicted by transnational power formations. The urge for a politics of reception 
originates from the awareness of the strictly interconnected material conditions of 
women in diverse parts of the world and from the recognition of the imbalance in the 
circulation of their standpoints. In this perspective, a politics of reception doesn’t have 
to be considered, as ‘a good practice’ within an already established transnational 
feminist community, but as a practice which is functional to the construction of such a 
community. As Alison Jaggar (2000: 21) warns us, we have to reject “the temptation to 
imagine some transnational counterpublic, within which varying local interpretations of 
women’s subordination receive final and authoritative adjudication”. Rather, the political 
project behind a “politics of reception” should be intended as a project of continuous 
mutual and collective re-signification of concepts among all members of a transnational 
community also based on the acknowledgment of the past and present problematic 
and hierarchical relations among women and within feminism itself.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The development of a feminist theory of knowledge, which coincides with and 
contributes to the so-called 'crisis' of modern thought, has determined a substantial 
redefinition of classical epistemology. Under feminist scrutiny, the subject and the 
object of knowledge have disclosed their gendered nature, putting under discussion the 
existence of a universal truth. Investigating the historical origin of the egalitarian model, 
which denies differences between individuals but leaves aside ‘sexual difference’, the 
feminist critique of science has revealed that  ‘woman’ has been constructed as binary 
opposed to the Cartesian subject. Consequently, feminist epistemology has turned out 
to be a political project aimed at promoting a positive process of redefinition of ‘woman’ 
as subject of an alternative form of knowledge. In this scenario, feminists’ claims have 
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been formulated from the perspective of women’s life and experience. In particular, the 
feminist rejection of postmodern relativism has led to the epistemic practice of 
addressing the ‘politics of location’ as a tool for producing more accountable or at least 
less distorted facts, while also going together with the attempt to develop standpoints 
through collective analysis of the workings of the ideological system on which social 
inequalities are based. The idea that, by collectively achieving an oppositional 
standpoint through political self-consciousness, feminists can generate more objective 
or less false and distorted accounts of the social world has reinforced the political 
project of a transnational alliance among women. In this sense, the political project 
behind transnational feminism can be regarded as a recovery of the main outcomes of 
the feminist epistemological debate. In fact, the accomplishment of such a project 
seems to depend mostly on the ability of communities of interpreters to rethink politics 
in postmodern time, through an analysis of inherited categories of thought and through 
the production of new concepts and discourses able to account for multiple conditions 
and claims. In other words, retaining the emancipatory project behind modernism, both 
feminist epistemology and transnational feminism are busy with the difficult task of 
accomplishing it through an acknowledgment of differences and inequalities among 
subject positions. With this aim in mind, transnational feminists who are busy building 
their communities of affiliation need to be aware of the danger of turning ‘the feminist 
dream of a common language’ into a nightmare, if they don’t recognize the 
interdependence, and yet the inequality, among different women’s lives and choices as 
well as their different experiences. This implies for transnational feminists being also 
able to acknowledge conflict, investigate their own privileged position and drop the 
search for a paralyzing totality. Coherently, as members of a community of interpreters, 
transnational feminists should not be seduced by fast consensus-creating signifiers but 
rather they should consider the epistemic and the ontology behind the terms adopted. 
This will allow transnational feminists to sharpen their critical tools, since it will avoid 
the risk of subsuming concepts derived by other historical circumstances empting them 
of specificity as well as the risk of assuming meta-feminist positions which inevitably 
reproduce power relations and colonial legacies. 
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